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NOTES
Piercing the Corporate Veil: Personal Liability of a
Corporate Officer for Intentional Interference with
Contract: 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney
The Louisiana Supreme Court in 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney,'
for the first time since its rejection in 1902, recognized the tort of
intentional interference with a contract. 2 In an opinion written by Justice
Dennis, the court did not hold this particular corporate officer liable,
but in dicta recognized the cause of action given appropriate circum-
stances.3
A corporate officer now owes a duty to refrain from intentional
acts that may cause problems to a third party in its performance of a
contract. 4 This decision makes Louisiana the last state to espouse this
tort.
5
Although some criticism has been leveled at the supreme court's
avoidance of the agency-principal issues presented, this note leaves that
criticism in the hands of those critics.6 Instead this note will examine
the court's decision with the goal of illuminating the policies and pitfalls
of the tort when applied to corporate officers, directors, and share-
holders. The application, of this cause of action in other jurisdictions
also will be discussed. Since the opinion does not provide any insight
into the outer limits of this newly reorganized tort, analyzing other
states' approaches will help gain an understanding of how the Louisiana
courts may apply the tort in the future.7
The facts and decision in 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc.' are discussed first,
followed by a brief general discussion of the new tort. The Note then
examines important policy considerations that are likely to influence the
application of the tort in the corporate environment. After discussing
Copyright 1990, by LOUISL4NA LAW REvmw.
1. 538 So. 2d 228 (La. 1989).
2. Id. at 231. See also, Kline v. Eubanks, 109 La. 241, 33 So. 211 (1902), which
has been the basis for the past rejection of the tort.
3. 538 So. 2d at 231, 234.
4. Id. at 231.
5. Robertson, Recovery in Louisiana Tort Law for Intangible Economic Loss: Neg-
ligence Actions and the Tort of Intentional Interference with Contractural Relations, 46
La. L. Rev. 737, 739 (1986).
6. Morris, Business Associations, 50 La. L. Rev. 211 (1989).
7. Since other jurisdictions have experience with the tort, their decisions will dem-
onstrate the problems inherent in its application as well as provide guidance in its
application.
8. 538 So. 2d 228 (La. 1989).
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the policy considerations, the next section explores the application of
the tort in other jurisdictions. The final sections analyze previous Louis-
iana court decisions and possible application of the new tort in the
future.
FACTS
Petr L. Spurney was Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Louisiana
World Exposition (LWE) from 1983 until the project's completion in
January 1985, and was also chairman of the management committee,
which approved all contract awards. Spurney's duties as CEO included
executing contracts and assigning the task of monitoring contract com-
pliance to the appropriate committees within the LWE organization.
The marketing division manager, Cynthia Houser, was responsible
for securing suppliers for LWE. 9 In February 1983, Houser and LWE's
art director met with potential uniform suppliers to request bids for
custom-designed uniforms.'0 From six bidders, only 9 to 5 Fashions and
Marlin Manufacturing met the necessary qualifications. Both submitted
preliminary proposals in April 1983. Thereafter, Houser, Spurney, and
their staff members met to prepare a proposal for the management
committee, recommending that Marlin be awarded the contract to be
the uniform supplier. The committee, however, deferred its final decision
until more information was obtained, requesting that both companies
submit amended proposals with firm prices.'
The committee sent additional bid specifications to both companies
on August 18, 1983, stipulating a September 1, 1983, deadline. Marlin
resubmitted its previous bid.' 2 Because of a time extension granted to
9 to 5 Fashions, it did not submit its bid by September 1. Notwith-
standing the extension, Spurney advised the concessions committee chair-
man on September 2, 1983, that the LWE staff would recommend Marlin
as the uniform supplier because their bid was lower than 9 to 5's.
One week later, 9 to 5 Fashions, without knowledge of Spurney's
recommendation, submitted a bid containing a joint proposal with Marlin
Manufacturing. Marlin, by correspondence, informed Houser that its
previous bid was withdrawn and that it had agreed to be a consultant
9. The goal of the supplier program was to obtain products and services at little
or no cost to LWE in exchange for the use of LWE logos by the respective supplier.
10. LWE officials estimated that it would take ten to twelve months to produce the
uniforms.
11. However, Houser allowed Marlin to submit "OOOA Standard" prices (an acronym
for Out-Of-Our-Ass-a wild guess). 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc.'v. Spurney, 520 So. 2d 1276,
1280 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988). This is evidence that the management of LWE favored
Marlin.
12. Id. at 1280.
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for 9 to 5 Fashions. The LWE staff, however, still recommended Marlin;
the committee agreed on Marlin.
On October 12, 1983, 9 to 5 Fashions filed suit against LWE,
Houser, and Marlin, alleging restraint of trade. 9 to 5 Fashions dropped
the suit when it was awarded the supplier contract, and Marlin became
their consultant. Spurney did not approve of this arrangement and
continuously expressed his dissatisfaction, even as late as November 7,
1983. Nevertheless, the management committee approved 9 to 5 Fashions
as the uniform supplier on November 16, 1983, although no final written
contract was executed until May 8, 1984, which was only four days
before the fair opened.
Attempting to timely complete their contractual obligations, 9 to 5
Fashions met with LWE staff in December to obtain uniform specifi-
cations. The company ordered fabric based on this meeting. Unbe-
knownst to 9 to 5 Fashions, these staff members had no authorization
to provide these specifications. When LWE failed to pay for the excess
fabric,"a 9 to 5 Fashions sought payment from Spurney based on his
impropriety in handling the contract between LWE and 9 to 5. The
district court found Spurney liable for these damages. The court of
appeal affirmed the district court but reduced the award. 14 The Louisiana
Supreme Court reversed on the liability issue, handing down an advisory
opinion on the new cause of action of intentional interference with
contract. I
GENERAL APPLICATION OF THE TORT
Although the elements of the tort of intentional interference with
contract vary from state to state, most states derive them from the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, 6 which defines the tort as follows:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the
performance of a contract ... between another and a third
person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not
to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other for
the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the
third person to perform the contract. 7
13. The insolvency of LWE provided an impetus for the action against Spurney. Id
at 1282.
14. Id. at 1286.
15. 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney, 538 So. 2d 228, 234 (La. 1989).
16. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 766-774A (1979).
17. Id. § 766.
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The tort possesses two burdens of proof.' The plaintiff must first
prove that the offending party acted intentionally.' 9 The burden then
shifts to the defendant to prove that his actions were justified and
therefore privileged. 20 Justified actions are exemplified when a corporate
actor advises the corporation to discharge an employee for inadequate
performance2' or a corporate actor encourages the corporation to breach
an unprofitable financing agreement.Y
Tim LOUISIANA APPROACH
Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 is the foundation of a cause of
action for a corporate actor's intentional interference with contract.2 3
In 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc., the court provided five requirements for this
cause of action:
(1) The existence of a contract or a legally protected interest
between the plaintiff and corporation;
(2) the corporate officer's knowledge of the contract;
(3) the officer's intentional inducement or causation of the cor-
poration to breach the contract or his intentional rendition of
its performance impossible or more burdensome;
(4) absence of justification on the part of the officer; and
(5) causation of damages to the plaintiff by the breach of
18. See infra text at note 20.
19. This is typically expressed as a desire to bring about the harm or knowledge that
the result was substantially certain to result from his actions. See generally Breland v.
Schilling, 550 So. 2d 609, 611-12 (La. 1989) (defining intent). Bazley v. Tortorich, 397
So. 2d 475, 481 (La. 1985) (defining intent).
20. Most states place the burden of proving justification on the defendant. See, e.g.,
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Aurora Air Service, Inc., 604 P.2d 1090, 1095 (Alaska
1979); Herron v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 56 Cal.2d 202, 207, 363 P.2d 310, 312,
14 Cal. Rptr. 294, 296 (1961); Barlow v. International Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881, 893,
522 P.2d 1102, 1114 (Idaho 1974); Wilkinson v. Powe, 300 Mich. 275, 1 N.W.2d 539,
542 (1942). Some states place the burden on the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's
conduct was unjustified or malicious. HPI Health Care Serv., Inc. v. Mt. Vernon Hospital,
131 II1. 2d 145, 545 N.E.2d 672, 677 (1989); Top Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate
Insurance Co., 283 Or. 201, 209, 582 P.2d 1365, 1371 (1978); Glenn v. Point Park College,
441 Pa. 474, 479-482, 272 A.2d 895, 898-900 (Pa. 1971). However, the latter approach
seems illogical. The evidence to prove justification is more easily accessable to the de-
fendant. Furthermore, justification is in the nature of a defense. The burden should be
on the defendant to prove justification.
21. Martin v. Platt, 179 Ind. App. 688, 386 N.E.2d 1026 (1979); Phillips v. Montana
Education Association, 610 P.2d 154 (Mont. 1980).
22. Stratford Group, Ltd. v. Interstate Bakeries Corp., 590 F. Supp. 859 (S.D.N.Y.
1984); See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 comments a-g (1977).
23. 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney, 538 So. 2d 228, 234 (La. 1989).
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contract or difficulty of its performance brought about by the
officer."
Other jurisdictions extend application of the tort to different types
of human relationships. 2 For example, some jurisdictions have recog-
nized the tort as a cause of action where a doctor advises other doctors
not to work at a certain clinic. 26
Corporate Actor's Liability Under 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc.
In Louisiana, third persons injured by breaches of contract due to
the encouragement of others have historically been unable to obtain
damages from the instigating wrongdoers. These persons, however, have
occasionally found relief under agency-principal concepts rather than
under traditional tort theories of negligence. 27 The court of appeal adopted
this view when it held Spurney liable for his conduct. Spurney, in that
court's opinion, had a duty to exercise due care in his relationship with
9 to 5 Fashions. By failing to diligently perform the contractual obli-
gations, Spurney was liable for injury the plaintiff suffered. 2 The court
held that an employee cannot shield himself behind the corporate veil
when he is the officer responsible for the corporation's harmful actions.
24. Id. at 231; these elements follow closely those stated in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts §§ 766-774A (1979), and also the elements used in other jurisdictions when
applying the tort. See, e.g., HPI Health Care Serv., Inc. v. Mt. Vernon Hosp., Inc.,
131 Ill. 2d 145, 545 N.E.2d 672 (1989); Phillips v. Montana Education Ass'n, 610 P.2d
154, 157 (Mont. 1980); Schroders, Inc. v. Hogan Systems, Inc., 137 Misc. 2d 738, 522
N.Y.S.2d 404 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987); Sakowitz, Inc. v. Steck, 669 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. 1984);
Under Montana law, the cause of action requires proof of: "(1) a contract, (2) refusal
of performance, (3) refusal induced by the unlawful and malicious acts of the defendant,
and (4) damages. See Phillips v. Montana Education Association, 610 P.2d 154 (Mont.
1980); under Michigan law, the elements of the tort are (1) the defendant's knowledge
of the contract, (2) the defendant's unjustified inducement of the breach or otherwise
rendering performance impossible, (3) subsequent breach or other such act, and (4) damage
to plaintiff." See also Seven D. Enterprises v. Fonzi, 438 F. Supp. 161 (E.D. Mich 1977)
(interpreting Michigan law).
25. Certified Laboratories of Texas, Inc. v. Rubinson, 303 F. Supp. 1014 (E.D. Pa.
1969) (intentional interference with a contract applied to a non-competition agreement);
Blatty v. New York Times Co., 42 Cal. 3d 1033, 728 P.2d 1177, 232 Cal. Rptr. 542
(1986) (defamation applied to intentional interference with possible economic advantage);
Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 289 N.C. 71, 221 S.E.2d 282 (1976) (liability for interference
with employment contract).
26. Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 444'U.S. 924, 100 S. Ct. 262 (1979).
27. See, e.g., Fryar v. Westside Habilitation Center, 479 So. 2d 883 (La. 1985); H.
B. "Buster" Hughes, Inc. v. Bernard, 318 So. 2d 9 (La. 1975); Canter v. Koehring Co.,
283 So. 2d 716 (La. 1973); Miller v. Upjohn Co., 465 So. 2d 42 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1985).




The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that Spurney was
not liable for interfering with the contract between 9 to 5 Fashions and
LWE because his actions as CEO of LWE were justified.2 9 The court
concluded that the plaintiff proved that Spurney knew of the contract
and that he was negligent in delaying its performance. The evidence,
however, established that "Spurney's delay in appointing a uniform
coordinator was not unusual or inconsistent" with procedure normally
followed in contracts with other suppliers.30 The court found that the
plaintiff failed to prove Spurney acted outside the scope of his authority
or in a manner he knew to be detrimental to LWE's interests.3" The
evidence failed to prove that Spurney circumvented the management
committee decision or delayed administration of the contract. The court
further found Spurney's delay in appointing a uniform coordinator was
due to normal bureaucratic procedures designed to choose the coordi-
nator.
For the action of a corporate officer to be justified and thereby
entitle him to immunity, the officer must act "within the scope of his
corporate authority and in a reasonable belief that his action was for
the benefit of the corporation. 3 2 In granting immunity to Spurney, the
court held:
[An officer is privileged to induce the corporation to violate
a contractual relation, or make its performance more burden-
some, provided that the officer does not exceed the scope of
his authority or knowingly commit acts that are adverse to the
interests of the corporation. Where officers knowingly and in-
tentionally act against the best interest of the corporation or
outside the scope of their authority, they can be held liable by
the party whose contract right has been damaged."
This holding indicates that the court does not intend to give the officer[s]
an absolute privilege. The privilege should be invoked only in situations
where it is necessary to allow the officer to perform his fiduciary duty
as authorized by the corporation. 4
The supreme court did pronounce that in recognizing the tort it
nevertheless did not intend to adopt "the fully expanded common law
doctrine" of the tort.35 The justification for this statement lies in the
common law's use of the tort to constantly delve into the motives of
29. 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney, 538 So. 2d 228, 231 (La. 1989).
30. Id. at 234.
31. Id. at 235.
32. Id. at 231.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 232.
35. Id. at 234.
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the corporate actor, which are often ambiguous and undefined. 6 The
supreme court has now recognized a tort and established its elements,
but did not offer any insight into its application. If the common law
applications are not to be adopted, where are lower courts to look for
guidance in applying the tort?
PREVAILING SOCIETAL CONCERNS
The corporate entity has provided investors and business operators
a mechanism for shielding themselves from liability. 7 The purpose of
this shield has been thought to encourage commercial growth through
investment. Since the landmark decision of Lumley v. Gye,3 g however,
courts have used various theories to destroy this shield, a process called
"piercing the corporate veil."
Since corporate officers and directors make the decisions to terminate
contracts, plaintiffs now seek relief by piercing the corporate veil to
hold the officers and directors personally liable. Many problems have
surfaced concerning important societal interests associated with the pierc-
ing of the corporate structure. 39 The liability shield is an integral part
of corporate existence.4° It insulates officers and directors from the
pressures created by the possibility of personal liability. Therefore, public
policy dictates that corporate officers and directors should possess im-
munity for interfering with a contract between the corporation and a
third party when they act or believe their actions are in the best interests
of the corporation.4' Largely due to these considerations, piercing the
corporate veil should be, and generally is, exercised with extreme caution.
The size of the corporate entity raises different considerations. Anal-
ysis of particular conduct should be made in light of the decision-making
structure in the two prevalent types of corporations-publicly-held and
closely-held.
Publicly-Held Corporations
Publicly-held corporations typically consist of thousands, sometimes
millions, of shareholders. Because of this vast corporate ownership,
36. Id.
37. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 766-774A (1979).
38. 2 El & BI. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q. B. 1853). (In Lumley, Gye induced an
opera singer to sing at his opera house through a higher fee offer than she was being
paid by Lumley. The Queen's Bench held that interference with a commercial relationship
can be actionable in tort.).
39. See generally, 3 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations §
1001 (Rev. Verm. ed. 1975); 2 Harper, James & Gray, Law of Torts §§ 6.5-6.10 (1986).
40. See generally Avins, Liability for Inducing a Corporation to Breach its Contract,
43 Cornell L.Q. 55 (1957).
41. Id.; W. Prosser and P. Keeton, Law of Torts § 129 (5th ed. 1984); 3 W. Fletcher,
Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 1001 (Rev. Perm. ed. 1975).
1990]
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corporate shareholders are usually detached from day-to-day manage-
ment, leaving officers and directors with the power to make corporate
decisions. Corporate officers and directors have a fiduciary duty to act
in the best interests of the shareholders and the corporation. 42 Included
within this fiduciary duty is the implied power for officers and directors
to breach contracts that further corporate goals, policies, and business
interests .43
Officers and directors, however, must act within some constraints.
Stability of contract is the backbone of a commercial economy; hence
decision makers cannot freely abrogate any contractual relationship with-
out undermining this stability." Although a risk of entering a contract
encompasses the possibility that the other party will breach, this risk
should not include consideration that the breach will be induced or
caused by someone not a party to the contract. 4 Thus, where officers
or directors act maliciously," or for personal interests and not in 'the
best interests of the corporation, 47 they should be personally liable for
their actions in causing the corporation to breach a contract. The premise
underlying this personal liability is that such wrongful acts should not
be immunized via the corporate shield. 4"
Arguably, shareholders could also face personal liability. Share-
holders can influence corporate decision making in some circumstances.
For example, if a group of shareholders joins together, they could form
a controlling block in the corporation. With this control, they could
force the corporation to breach contracts that benefit the shareholders'
collective interests. Most courts, however, have been unwilling to extend
liability to shareholders, 49 the theory being that since shareholders are
owners of the corporation, they need not be held personally liable because
42. La. R.S. 12:226 (1969); 3 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations
§ 1001 (Rev. Perm. ed. 1975); Avins, Liability for Inducing a Corporation to Breach its
Corporation, 43 Cornell L. Q. 55 (1957).
43. 3 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations § 1001 (Rev. Perm. ed.
1975).
44. Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expectancies: A Clash
of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 61 (1982); Sayre, Inducing Breach
of Contract, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 663 (1923); Note, Tortious Interference with Contract: A
Reassertion of Society's Interest in Commercial Stability and Contractual Integrity, 81
Colum. L. Rev. 1491 (1981); Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic
Loss: A Reassessment, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1513 (1985).
45. 3 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations, § 1001 (Rev.
Perm. ed. 1975); W. Prosser and P. Keeton, Law of Torts § 129 (5th ed. 1984).
46. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 766-774A (1979).
47. Id. See supra note 42 and sources cited therein.
48. See supra note 42.
49. See Rao v. Rao, 718 F.2d 219 (7th Cir. 1983) (interpreting Illinois law); Tye v.
Finkelstein, 160 F. Supp. 666 (D. Mass. 1958); see generally.J. Dooley, Modern Tort
Law § 44.07 (1984).
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the corporation will be financially responsible for the breaches.50 This
theory obviously falls when the corporation is insolvent.5
Closely-Held Corporations
Closely-held corporations consist of a few stockholders, who are
usually the corporate officers and directors. If shareholders of closely-
held corporations are set on equal footing as shareholders of publicly-
held corporations, an injured third party would be without a remedy,
not only against the shareholders, but also against the officers and
directors since they are usually one in the same.52
In the case of closely-held corporations where shareholders are also
the directors and officers of the corporation, it is important to exercise
extreme care in deciding the issue of liability of the corporate directors
and officers. It can be argued that since an individual cannot be liable
for inducing himself to breach a contract, shareholders, directors, or
officers cannot be liable for inducing the corporation to breach the
contract when, in effect, they and the corporation are one." If this
reasoning is universally applied without reservation, then closely-held
corporations provide a sanctuary through which individuals can act
maliciously and unjustifiedly, causing injury to third persons without
accountability. Corporate officers, directors and shareholders in close
corporations should not be allowed to hide behind the corporate veil
at the expense of third parties. Although the preservation of the corporate
entity is important in a commercial economy, the corporate veil should
not provide a shield to corporate actors who act for their own personal
benefit or act maliciously in inducing a breach of contract with a third
party.
Synopsis
Corporate business decisions and investment are a fundamental part
of the American economy. It is this significant role that corporations
occupy that must be considered in determining the personal liability of
corporate actors. Piercing the corporate veil should be treated somewhat
differently when dealing with publicly-held corporations in comparison
to closely-held corporations.
50. 3 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations § 1001 (Rev. Perm. ed.
1975).
51. A court hopefully will recognize the defect in not holding the shareholders
personally liable. In these situations, the court could resort to a corporate veil piercing
theory.





In publicly-held corporations the officers and directors serve the
corporation and its shareholders in a fiduciary capacity. The corporate
veil acts as a barrier to ensure that business judgment will not be
hindered by the fear of personal liability. Thousands of shareholders
rely on the business decisions of the officers and directors. But when
officers, directors, or shareholders effectuate a breach of contract that
cannot be justified as in the best interests of the corporation, the need
to protect the corporate actor diminishes and personal liability should
attach.
Courts should also exercise caution when dealing with closely-held
corporations. Unlike publicly-held corporations, total investment in closely-
held corporations is usually in the hands of the officers and directors;
so to hold an officer or director liable is to hold a shareholder liable.
This creates a fiduciary duty less broad than that owed by' publicly-held
corporations because the duty is generally owed to oneself rather than
unknown shareholders. Therefore, society's interests in protecting these
corporate actors is not as strong. Thus, where a third party is injured
because of a corporate actor's inducement of a breach, the corporate
veil should be pierced more readily to find personal liability, unless the
breach is in the best interests of the corporation.
THE TORT IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Since Louisiana has never recognized the cause of action for inten-
tional interference with a contract, decisions from other jurisdictions
can be used as a guide in an attempt to determine how Louisiana courts
will apply the tort. All other United States jurisdictions have pierced
the corporate veil to recognize personal liability of corporate officers,
directors, and shareholders under the tort.5 4
In Stratford Group, Ltd. v. Interstate Bakeries," the United States
District Court held that under New York law a director of a corporation
is immune from liability to a third party for inducing the corporation
to breach a contract with that party unless it is shown that the director
committed a tort independent of the alleged breach or acted for his
own beneficial interest and not in the interest of the corporation.16 In
Stratford Group, Ltd., a third party sought to hold a corporate officer
54. See, e.g., Harrell v. Reynolds Metals Co., 495 So. 2d 1381 (Ala. 1986); Marin
v. Jacuzzi, 224 Cal. App. 2d 549, 36 Cal. Rptr. 880 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1964); Georgia
Power Co. v. Busbin, 242 Ga. 612, 250 S.E.2d 442 (1978); Kiyose v. Trustees of Indiana
University, 166 Ind. App. 34, 333 N.E.2d 886 (1975); A. S. Rampell, Inc. v. Hyster Co.,
3 N.Y.2d 369, 144 N.E.2d 371, 165 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1957). See generally, Liability of
Corporate Director, Officer, or Employee for Tortious Interference with Corporation's
Contract With Another, 72 A.L.R. 4th 492 (1989).
55. 590 F. Supp. 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (interpreting New York law).
56. Id. at 865.
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liable for intentionally encouraging the defendant corporation to breach
a financing agreement. The corporate officer was not held personally
liable because the plaintiff failed to prove that the officer had engaged
in tortious conduct separate from his conduct as a director. 7 This
decision illustrates one court's unwillingness to extend personal liability
to a corporate officer when no malfeasance can be demonstrated. If a
corporate officer believes, as was the case in Stratford Group, Ltd.,
that it is in the best interests of the corporation to breach a contract,
fear of personal liability should not hinder his business judgment. Parties
enter contracts with the knowledge and acceptance of the risks a breach
might entail.
In deciding the same issue, the Michigan Supreme Court held that:
Merely to persuade a person to break his contract may not
be wrongful in law or fact; still, if the persuasion be used for
the indirect purpose of injuring the plaintiff, or benefitting the
defendant at the expense of the plaintiff, it is a malicious act,
which, in law and in fact, is a wrongful act, and, therefore,
an actionable act, if injury issues from it."
What this decision demonstrates is that the motives of the corporate
actor are determinative of personal liability, not the breach.
In Swager v. Couri19 the Illinois Supreme Court stated that Illinois
law recognizes a cause of action against corporate officers and share-
holders for the malicious exercise of corporate decision-making authority
to breach a legal obligation.60 In Swager, plaintiff sought recovery from
corporate officers, directors, and shareholders for their decision to dis-
solve the corporation and thereby breach its contract with the plaintiff.
The lower court found the corporate actors liable, but the Illinois
Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's reversal, recognizing a
privilege for corporate officers and directors to use their business judg-
ment and discretion on behalf of their corporations. 6' The rationale
behind granting the privilege was that the duty of corporate officers
and directors to their corporation's shareholders outweighs any duty
they might owe to the corporation's contract creditors. 62
In HPI Health Care Services v. Mt. Vernon Hospital, Inc.,63 the
Illinois Supreme Court reaffirmed Illinois law stating that a cause of
57. Id.
58. Morgan v. Andrews, 107 Mich. 33, 39, 64 N.W. 871 (1895). See also Seven D.
Enterprises, Ltd. v. Fonzi, 438 F. Supp 161, 163 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
59. 77 Ill. 2d 173, 395 N.E.2d 921, 927 (1979).
60. Id. at 190, 395 N.E.2d at 928.
61. Id. at 192, 395 N.E.2d at 928.
62. Id.
63. 131 I11. 2d 145, 545 N.W.2d 672 (1989) (hospital management firm held to be
in similar relationship to hospital as corporate directors and officers of corporations).
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action exists against corporate directors, officers, and shareholders who
interfere with a contract between the corporation and a third party for
personal gain or for the purpose of injuring the third party." The
corporate actor's purpose must be in furtherance of the corporation's
interests to be justified. 65
In Phillips v. Montana Education Association," the Montana Su-
preme Court stated that the fact there is an available action against the
party who breaches the contract is no defense to the one who induces
the breach since the two are joint wrongdoers, and each is liable for
the loss. In Phillips, directors of the Montana Education Board (MEA)
terminated Phillips' two-year contract of employment after six months.
Phillips filed a complaint for breach of contract against the corporation
and intentional interference with contract against the directors. The court
deciding the issue stated that liability will turn upon the ultimate purpose
or objective the defendant seeks to advance. 67 The Montana Supreme
Court stated that "[tlo determine whether interference with contractual
relations is justified, public policy considerations must be examined.
Justification or privilege constitutes the primary defense to an action
for interference. "6 One public policy consideration is that the shield of
liability is needed in order to allow corporations to effectively function.
An opposing policy consideration, however, is that corporate actors
should not be allowed to commit torts at will, then escape accountability
by hiding behind the corporate veil."
In Phillips, the directors were not liable because their actions "were
within the scope of their employment, designed without malice, and in
the furtherance of corporate interests." Because Phillips was unable to
prove that the directors acted contrary to corporate purposes and in-
terests, the directors were extended the privilege of limited liability. 70
The above decisions from other jurisdictions indicate a reluctance
to hold corporate actor's liable even when their actions are not clearly
justified. The decisions indicate that a corporate actor must act in the
best interests of the corporation to be entitled to the protection of the
corporate veil. This privilege of limited liability is extended to corporate
actors who do not commit an independent tort, act maliciously, or act
solely for personal benefit when encouraging the corporation to breach.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 610 P.2d 154 (Mont. 1980).
67. Id. at 157.
68. Id.; See also Estes, Expanding Horizons In the Law of Torts-Tortious Inter-
ference, 23 Drake L. Rev. 341, 358 (1974).
69. 610 P.2d at 157-58.
70. Id. at 158.
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Consideration of the public policy issue is a key element underlying
the granting of the privilege. The main policy concerns are the fiduciary
duty corporate actors owe to the corporation, the effect of personal
liability on the corporate actor's decision-making process, and the par-
ameters of accountability that should be levied against corporate actors.
These policy considerations necessarily entail subjective evaluation of the
corporate actor's individual decisions. This analysis must be done on a
case-by-case basis-an approach which Louisiana courts should utilize
when applying this cause of action.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE TORT IN LouISIANA
In 1902, the Louisiana Supreme Court refused to recognize a cause
of action for intentional interference with a contract in Kline v. Eubanks"3
and no Louisiana court recognized the tort since that time until the
decision in 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney.72 In the past decade,
however, lower courts have increasingly expressed their willingness to
recognize the tort. Perhaps with the decision in 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc.
these lower courts will be able to practice what they have preached.
The Past
In Kline v. Eubanks,71 Kline entered into a contract with a laborer,
requiring the laborer to farm a tract of land and pay rental to Kline
from a portion of the harvest. Relying on the contract, Kline assisted
the laborer with money and goods. The laborer left the farm to enter
the employ of Eubanks before paying Kline the rent due. Kline sued
Eubanks for knowingly enticing away the laborer and thereby causing
the laborer to breach the contract with Kline.
The basis for Kline's claim was Louisiana Civil Code article 2315,
which at that time stated in pertinent part:
[E]very act whatever of man that causes damage to another
obliges him by whose fault it happened, to repair it.74
In denying relief to the plaintiff, the supreme court relied on treatises
and cases from other jurisdictions, which did not recognize the tort."
These states, however, have long since recognized tortious interference
with contract, while Louisiana prior to 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. failed to
shift its stance.76
71. 109 La. 241, 33 So. 211 (La. 1902).
72. 538 So. 2d 228 (La. 1989).
73. 109 La. 241, 33 So. 211 (La. 1902).
74. 109 La. at 246, 33 So. at 213.
75. Id.
76. 538 So. 2d 228 (La. 1989); Robertson, Recovery in Louisiana Tort Law for
Intangible Economic Loss: Negligence Actions and the Tort of Intentional Interference
with Contractural Relations, 46 La. L. Rev. 738 (1986).
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Louisiana courts have adhered strictly to the supreme court mandate
throughout the years. 77 The decision in Kline, however, came under fire
in 1981 in Moss v. Guarisco,78 where Moss sued for damage caused
when Guarisco negotiated a sale of a car dealership, originally promised
to Moss, with a third party. Moss claimed that Guarisco's actions caused
General Motors to deny him a Pontiac dealership. Although Moss' claim
was denied, the court of appeal stated that an action may be available
against the third person who negotiated with Guarisco to buy the car
dealership.
The first circuit in Moss criticized the supreme court's "unflinching
adherence" to Kline v. Eubanks.7 9 It encouraged an examination of the
changing social and economic conditions of the twentieth century when
deciding whether to recognize the action. 0 The court stressed the need
for reevaluation of the Louisiana position.
Another criticism of adherence to the Kline decision came in a
footnote and concurring opinion in Sanborn v. Oceanic Contractors,
Inc.,8 wherein Sanborn sought relief for Oceanic's failure to release
him to the employ of another company. Even though Sanborn had left
the employ of Oceanic for eight months, Oceanic would not release
him. Sanborn did not allege intentional interference with a contract so
the court did not decide the issue. In a footnote, however, the court
stated that had Sanborn alleged and proven Oceanic intentionally in-
terfered with the contract, he may have been entitled to relief.8 2 Judge
Lemmon in his concurrence said that the plaintiff stated a cause of
action for intentional interference with contractual relations. 3
These Louisiana decisions evidence a change in the attitude of the
judiciary toward the tort. With the supreme court's recognition of the
tort, even though in an advisory opinion, plaintiffs should be more
confident when alleging the cause of action.
The Future
In 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc., the court set out the elements of the new
tort." The perplexing element is the final one of justification. The
77. See, e.g., Sanborn v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 448 So. 2d 91 (La. 1984); Glazer
v. Comm'n of Ethics For Pub. Employees, 431 So. 2d 752 (La. 1983); H.B. "Buster"
Hughes, Inc. v. Bernard, 318 So. 2d 9 (La. 1975); Miller v. Upjohn Co., 465 So. 2d 42
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1985); Scariano Bros., Inc. v. Hammond Constr., 428 So. 2d 564
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1983); Linzay v. Tangipahoa Parish Farm Bureau, 387 So. 2d 1343
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
78. 409 So. 2d 323 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
79. Id. at 330.
80. Id.
81. 448 So. 2d 91 (La. 1984).
82. Id. at 95 n.5.
83. Id.
84. 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney, 538 So. 2d 228, 234 (La. 1989).
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supreme court basically defined two criteria that need to be proven to
establish justification. The corporate member's actions must be within
the scope of his authority and must be in the best interest of the
corporation.85 The supreme court did not fully explain the burden of
proving these two criteria of the justification element, but decisions from
other jurisdictions on the issue may provide guidance for their future
application by Louisiana courts.
In Los Angeles Airways, Inc. v. Davis,86 the Ninth Circuit applying
California law, provided a detailed discussion of the two elements of
justification.8 7 The court stated that "[t]he existence and scope of the
privilege ... must be determined with reference to the societal interests
which it is designed to protect.' '88 In determining such interests, the
court said, the officer must have used lawful means in inducing the
breach of contract and the interest must be of greater value than the
stability of the contract.89 The privilege is designed to protect the fi-
duciary relationship between an agent and his principal. Basically, the
court stated that the officer, to act within the scope of his authority,
must act the way any reasonable officer in a like position as a fiduciary
for the corporation would act.
In deciding whether the corporate officer acted in the best interests
of the corporation it is necessary to evaluate his intent in light of the
societal interests the privilege is designed to promote.90 To grant the
privilege the intent must be "impersonal and disinterested." 91 If he
induces the corporation to breach a contract to further his own economic
or other personal gain, then the privilege will be denied. The officer
must maintain fidelity, good faith, and his fiduciary responsibility toward
the corporation. 92
When the corporate actor acts with "mixed motives" the justification
issue is more difficult. For example, an officer may gain personally by
inducing the corporation to breach the contract, but also be acting in
the best interest of the corporation. Because it is very difficult to
distinguish which motive spurs the officer to act, the cases usually are
85. Id. at 235.
86. 687 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1982).
87. 687 F.2d at 325; see also Herron v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 56 Cal.2d 202,
205, 363 P.2d 310, 312, 14 Cal. Rptr. 294, 296 (1961); Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 18
Cal.2d 33, 112 P.2d 631 (1941); Olivet v. Frischling, 104 Cal. App. 3d 831, 840, 164
Cal. Rptr. 87, 91 (1980).
88. 687 F.2d at 325; See generally, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 c, d, e
(1979).
89. 687 F.2d at 325.
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decided in favor of granting the privilege to the corporate actor.93
Although human nature generally gives some clues as to the corporate
member's motives, granting the privilege when the motives are unclear
fosters the fiduciary relationship of the officer and the corporation."
In Swager v. Couri, 95 the Illinois Supreme Court stated that the
corporate officer must act within the scope of his power, and not act
for his personal benefit or with the intent of injuring the plaintiff when
encouraging the corporation to breach the contract.9 This process adds
the intent to injure the third party as an extra consideration to the
standard of acting in the best interests of the corporation. Thus, if the
officer acted in the best interests of the corporation, but intended to
injure the plaintiff, the privilege would not be extended to the officer . 7
In Southwestern States Oil and Gas Co. v. Sovereign Resources,
Inc.,9s Texas law was applied and the court stated the privilege is extended
to a corporate officer acting within the scope of his power or authority
as long as he did not engage in fraud in inducing the breach.9 The
corporate actor also must act with proper motives in causing the breach.
This decision adds the element of fraud when evaluating the cor-
porate actor's action. Obviously the fiduciary duty of a corporate actor
does not encompass authority to act fraudulently. By acting with a
fraudulent intent, the corporate actor goes outside the scope of his
authority and would not be protected by the privilege.
The common thread found throughout the decisions is that the
corporate officer must act with a "proper motive" to be granted the
protection of the privilege. "Proper motive" encompasses the scope of
authority provided to the corporate actor and the corporate actor's
intent to act in the best interests of the corporation. The main policy
consideration centers on protecting the fiduciary relationship between
the corporate actor and the corporation, which fosters unpressured cor-
porate decision-making. If the corporate actor's motives are for personal
gain, are malicious, or are based on a fraudulent scheme, then the actor
93. Avins, Liability for Inducing a Corporation to Breach its Contract, 43 Cornell
L.Q. 55 (1957); 3 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Torts § 129 (5th ed. 1984).
94. See also Mellor v. Budget Advisors, Inc., 415 F.2d- 1218 (7th Cir. 1969) (applying
Illinois law); Ong Hing v. Arizona Harness Raceway, Inc., 10 Ariz. App. 380, 459 P.2d
107 (Ct. App. 1969); Wampler v. Palmerton, 250 Or. 65, 439 P.2d 601 (1968).
95. 77 Ill. 2d 173, 395 N.E.2d 921 (1979).
96. Id.; See also George A. Fuller Co. v. Chicago College of Osteopathic Medicine,
719 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. 1983) (interpreting Illinois law); Kufalk v. Hart, 610 F. Supp.
1178 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (interpreting Illinois law); Loewenthal Securities Co. v. White Paving
Co., 351 Ill. 285, 184 N.E. 310 (1932).
97. Accountability for intentionally inflicted injuries should not be circumvented by
extending the privilege created by the corporate veil.
98. 365 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. Ct. App. 1963).
99. Id. at 422; See generally Carlson Machine Tools, Inc. v. American Tool, Inc.,
678 F.2d 1253 (5th Cir. 1982) (interpreting Texas law); Raymond v. Yarrington, 96 Tex.
443, 73 S.W. 800 (1903); Gonzalez v. Gutierrez, 694 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
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should not be protected. Granting the protection of the corporate veil
would defeat the purpose of protecting this fiduciary relationship.
In the recent Louisiana decision of Tallo v. Stroh Brewery Co.,' °°
the fourth circuit court of appeal held that the plaintiff did not state
a cause of action for intentional interference with contract.10 1 In Tallo,
the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's actions induced a third party
to breach the purchase agreement with the plaintiff.10 2 In deciding the
issue, the court cited 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney'03 and stated that
the supreme court did not intend to expand the tort to the plaintiff's
cause of action. °4 In the concurring opinion, Chief Judge Schott sug-
gested that the tort should be expanded to encompass situations outside
of the corporate setting. The judge asserted, however, that it is the
function of the supreme court to expand the cause of action, not that
of an intermediate appellate court.'05 Thus, one court apparently is not
willing to expand the tort. Whether other courts follow its lead is yet
to be seen. Other jurisdictions apply the tort to areas outside of the
corporate setting.' °0 But if the past is to be our guide, Louisiana courts
will not expand the cause of action until the Louisiana Supreme Court
mandates its expansion.
CONCLUSION
When applying the tort of intentional interference with contract to
the corporate setting, the judiciary should require proof of (1) the
existence of a contract, (2) the corporate officer's knowledge of the
contract, (3) inducement by the officer to breach the contract, (4) absence
of justification for the inducement, and (5) damages to the plaintiff.'07
The problem of determining whether to afford the corporate actor the
privilege of the protection of the corporate veil turns on the element
of justification.
Unfortunately for the Louisiana legal community, the supreme court's
decision in 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney'018 provides little guidance
for the tort's application. The court in dicta recognized the tort, then
proceeded to hold that Spurney's actions were justified. Application of
the tort in other jurisdictions, however, provides valuable guidance and
should be utilized by Louisiana courts.
100. 544 So. 2d 452 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989).
101. Id. at 455.
102. Id. at 452-54.
103. 538 So. 2d 228 (La. 1989).
104. Tallo v. Stroh Brewery Co., 544 So. 2d at 453-54.
105. Id. at 455.
106. See supra note 25.
107. 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney, 538 So. 2d 228 (La. 1989); See generally 3
W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations, § 1001 (Rev. Perm. ed.
1975); Restatement (Second) of Torts '§§ 766-774A (1979).
108. 538 So. 2d 228 (La. 1989).
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Decisions from other jurisdictions indicate that the most problematic
aspect of proving justification is determining the corporate actor's mo-
tives for inducing the corporation to breach the contract. The judiciary
must ascertain whether the corporate actor acted maliciously or for
personal gain in the inducement. Conversely, if the corporate actor acts
for the benefit of the corporation, his actions are justified. Although
public policy encourages the protection given by the corporate veil,
malicious or other intentionally injurious acts should not be protected.
The privilege of limited liability provided by the corporate veil is designed
to foster the fiduciary relationship between the corporation and its agent.
When deciding to grant the privilege, courts must keep in mind un-
derlying policy considerations that encourage its application. If liability
is allowed to extend to corporate directors, officers, or shareholders
-every time they encourage the corporation to breach a contract, the fear
of personal liability could greatly stifle corporate decision-making. Fur-
thermore, shareholders, knowing that the directors or officers could be
influenced in their decision-making by fear of personal liability, may
be deterred from corporate investments which could greatly effect the
national economy.
When the corporate actor acts with mixed motives, °9 courts should
carefully analyze the effect of the corporate actor's actions. Corporate
officials must be protected from the pressures attributed to the prospect
of personal liability in the corporate decision-making process. Any doubt
or lack of proof as to the "good faith" of the corporate actor should
be resolved in favor of protecting the corporate actor, provided that
the actions were in the best interests of the corporation.
The courts must also look at the necessity of maintaining stability
in contractual relations. A commercial economy is founded on the
stability of contracts. Intermeddlers have never been looked upon fa-
vorably in the contract realm. The corporate veil should not be used
to protect intermeddlers who lack justification for their interference.
Finally, lower courts should not wait for further instruction from
the supreme court before recognizing and applying the cause of action.
Although the supreme court chose to limit the action to the facts in 9
to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney,110 the court did recognize intentional
interference with contract as a valid cause of action and overruled Kline
v. Eubanks."' This indicates a willingness, albeit a reluctant willingness,
of the supreme court to accept the tort. Lower courts should make the
best of the inch given to them.
This note is not advocating unbridled application of the tort. But
the tort has found its usefulness in other jurisdictions and Louisiana
109. See supra note 91.
110. 538 So. 2d at 235.
111. 109 La. 241, 33 So. 211 (La. 1902).
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courts should carefully and skillfully develop a proper place for the tort
in the Louisiana legal system.
Kevin Paul Landreneau

